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THE EFFECT OF TITLE I OF THE 1949
FEDERAL HOUSING ACT ON NEW YORK
CITY COOPERATIVE AND CONDOMINIUM
CONVERSION PLANS
I. Introduction
Many New York City apartment complexes were built with gov-
ernment aid under Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act (the
Housing Act).' The purpose of Title I, entitled "Slum Clearance
and Community Development and Redevelopment," was to induce
private investors to clear slum areas and increase residential housing. 2
Title I is the only significant part of the Housing Act for which
no prior legislative action had been taken on the federal level. 3
Although the 1937 Housing Act mentioned slum clearance, 4 the 1949
Housing Act was the first government legislation to recognize "slums" 5
as a national problem. 6
1. Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, 414 (1949).
2. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1552 (1949). See generally
Comment, The Housing Act of 1949-A Federal Program for Public Housing and
Slum Clearance, 44 ILL. L. REV. 685 (1949) (discussion on slum clearance programs)
[hereinafter cited as Act of 1949].
3. The United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, ch. 896 (1937).
The 1937 Act, the predecessor housing act of the 1949 Act, did not effectively
govern the national slum problem. See Lashly, Government and Urban Redevel-
opment: A Fresh Start for the "Ill-Housed," 37 A.B.A. J. 881, 882 (1951) [here-
inafter cited as Lashly].
4. The United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, ch. 896 (1937).
The 1937 Housing Act mentioned slum clearance, but was not sufficient 'to bring
the community through plans of redevelopment. -See generally Lashly, supra note
3, at 882 (discussion of slum clearance).
5. A slum is "a highly congested urban residential area characterized by
deteriorated unsanitary buildings, poverty and social disorganization. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2147 (4th ed. 1976). "Slums" are areas
which foster delinquency, disease and crime. See H.R. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 13 (1949). Slum areas are "evidence of the extravagant wastes of human
and other resources." Id.; see also Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301, 303 (1957) (discussion of slums) [hereinafter cited as
Johnstone].
6. The 1949 Housing Act was the first "firm national housing policy" to have
an impact on slum clearance. S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1558
(1949).
On the basis of . . .the findings of previous congressional investigations
during the past 5 years, it seems clearly established that only through
an effective program of Federal aid can teal progress be made in the
clearance of slums. This is amply supported by the testimony presented
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Under Title I, the federal government provided grants to local
public agencies for the purpose of clearing away slum areas.7 The
Housing Act provided for a loan fund of $1 billion to become
available over a five year period' and for a $500 million capital
grant program.9 Grants were made available to local public agencies
to finance the initial costs of planning a project; acquiring, clearing
or preparing the land for sale; and selling or leasing the land.' 0
Title I required each project to be constructed pursuant to a
specific redevelopment agreement and plan, which were to be drafted
by the appropriate local agency." In New York City, each Title I
redevelopment agreement 2 included one paragraph that comprised
on behalf of the United States Conference of Mayors and the American
Municipal Association. Moreover, the testimony presented by the Surgeon
General of the United States indicates that there is ample justification
for such a Federal program in light of the serious impact of slum
conditions on the lives and development of millions of American families
and their children.
Id. at 1561; see also Note, Slum Clearance and Public Housing, 3 J. PUB. L. 261,
261-62 (1954) (discussion of slum problem) [hereinafter cited as Slum Clearance
and Public Housing].
7. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562 (1949). See generally
Jacobs & Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and Disused Land Available
and Usable, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1957) (discussion of redevelopment efforts made
to fight the slum problem) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs]. "Slum clearance" refers
to the "destruction of overpopulated, unsanitary housing areas in which the struc-
tures are deteriorated beyond hope of reclamation. [I]n a more limited sense, this
term refers to clearance of deteriorated areas for the purpose of using the land
for constructing low-rent public housing." Id. at 246.
8. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562 (1949). This $1 billion
loan authorization became available over a 5-year period, starting with $25,000,000
on July 1, 1949, and increasing by $225,000,000 on July 1, 1950 and by further
amounts of $250,000,000 on July 1 of each of the three succeeding years. Id.
9. Id. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Housing Act's capital grant program.
10. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562 (1949).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949). Title I stated:
Appropriate local public bodies shall be encouraged and assisted to
undertake positive programs of encouraging and assisting the development
of well-planned, intergrated residential neighborhoods, the development
and redevelopment of communities, and the production, at lower costs,
of housing of sound standards of design, construction, livability, and
size for adequate family life ....
Id.
12. Each Title I project had a separate redevelopment agreement. This Note is
concerned with the redevelopment agreements of three different New York City
properties: (1) Kips Bay Towers, see infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text; (2)
Coliseum Park Apartments, see infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text; and (3)
Park West Village, see infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
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a covenant, running with the land, which provided that "for the
period of forty (40) years from the completion of the housing project
no change shall be made in the project as set forth in the Rede-
velopment Plan . . . without the consent of the City Planning Com-
mission and the Board of Estimate of the City .... "I'
Currently, the three Manhattan housing projects built pursuant to
Title I which are involved in litigation14 are the only three Title I
actions pending in the United States that address the issue of a
housing project's conversion plan. 5 The three developments, which
argue that city approval of a conversion is unnecessary, have ex-
pressed intentions of converting their units from rental to condom-
inium or cooperative ownership. 16 However, if such action constitutes
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. This provision is found in the
following sections of the three projects' redevelopment agreements: (1) § 510(c) of
the Kips Bay redevelopment agreement; (2) § 510(b) of the Coliseum redevelopment
agreement; and (3) § 509(b) of the Park West redevelopment agreement (emphasis
added in text).
14. These three Title I projects have been involved in litigation concerning the
issue of whether a conversion to ownership status is permitted. See Kramer v. Kips
Bay Towers Assoc., No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Coliseum Park
Apartments Co. v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983); Park West Village Assocs. v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983).
15. See letter of Oliver A. Rosengart, Assistant New York State Attorney
General, April 2, 1985 (on reserve at Fordham Law Library). Mr. Rosengart states
that:
[T]o the best of my knowledge there are no cases in the United States
concerning the conversion of properties built on Title I ... sites to
cooperative or condominium ownership other than the cases involving
Park West Village, Coliseum Park Apartments and Kips Bay Towers. I
am the Assistant Attorney General who has been primarily responsible
for these cases and I am fully familar with the case law on this subject.
Id.; see also N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, at RE7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1984, at B4, col. I. Currently, these are the only Title I projects involved in
litigation. However, it is possible for other Title I projects throughout the United
States to become involved in similar litigation provided that the local redevelopment
agreement included the "forty-year change" provision. This provision is found in
the following sections of the three projects' redevelopment agreements: (1) § 510(c)
of the Kips Bay redevelopment agreement; (2) § 510(b) of the Coliseum redevel-
opment agreement; and (3) § 509(b) of the Park West redevelopment agreement.
New York City is unique because its housing laws, such as rent control and
stabilization, are more involved and detailed than most jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
N.Y. City's rent control laws. For history and discussion of rent controls in N.Y.
City, see Note, The ABC's of MBR: How to Spell Trouble in Landlord/Tenant
Relations (Up Against the Crumbling Walls), 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 113
(1974); Note, Residential Rent Control in New York City, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 30 (1967); Note, Emergency Tenant Protection in New York: Ten Years
of Rent Stabilization, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1979).
16. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B4, col. 1.
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a "change" for purposes of the covenant in the redevelopment
agreement, Board of Estimate and City Planning Commission ap-
proval would be required for a conversion to take effect, in which
case, these conversion plans may be in jeopardy.
This Note analyzes whether the conversion of rental units built
under Title I to ownership units 7 constitutes a "change" as inter-
preted by the New York courts. 8 The interpretation of the term
"change" under the Title I redevelopment agreements will be ana-
lyzed from both the City of New York's 9 and the private developer's
views. 20 In addition, the legislative purposes behind Title I's enactment
will be examined from the perspectives of both the City of New
York2I and the private developer.2 2 Finally, the current status of
Title I will be discussed. 23 This Note concludes that a "change,"
17. Condominiums and cooperatives are two forms of ownership.
Condominium is [a] system of separate ownership of individual units in
a multiple-unit building. A single real property parcel with all the unit
owners having a right in common to use the common elements with
separate ownership confined to the individual units which are serially
designated .... A condominium is an estate in real property consisting
of an undivided interest in common in a portion of a parcel of real
property together with a separate interest in space in a residential, in-
dustrial, or commercial building on such real property, such as an
apartment, office or store.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (5th ed. 1979).
"Cooperative apartments [are] dwelling units in a multiple-unit complex in which
each owner has an interest in the entire complex and a lease of his own apartment,
though he does not own his apartment as in the case of a condominium." Id. at
302 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Castle, Legal Phases of Cooperative Buildings,
2 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1928) (discussion concerning condominiums); Flamm,
Housing Co-operatives, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 590, 590-95 (1946) (same) [hereinafter
cited as Flamm]; Garfinkel, The Uniform Condominium Act, PRAC. LAW. 43 (No.
8 1982) (same) [hereinafter cited as Garfinkel]; Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of
Cooperative Housing, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 126, 129 (1947) (same) [here-
inafter cited as Yourman].
18. Title I of the Housing Act is defined as the "Slum Clearance and Community
Development" section. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1469 (1949). See infra notes 26-66
and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of Title I and the 1949
Federal Housing Act.
19. See infra notes 129-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 160-94 and accompanying text. The use of the term "owner/
sponsor" is synonymous with the term "private developer." The Administrative
Code of New York defines a sponsor as any "person . . . who makes or takes
part in a public offering or sale . . . of securities consisting primarily of shares
or participation interests or investments in real estate including cooperative interests
in realty." N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 18.1(c)(1) (1983).
21. See infra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 213-39 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
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for purposes of New York City redevelopment agreements drafted
pursuant to Title I, refers only to land use and density and does
not relate to the form of ownership.2 4 Therefore, city approval should
not be required for a Title I building to convert to condominium
or cooperative status. 25
II. Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act
A. The Need for Federal Government Participation
One of the essential purposes of government is to protect and
foster the general welfare of the public.2 6 The housing problem,
which threatened the well-being of the populace, became especially
critical in 1949.27 On the basis of 1947 Census Bureau figures, there
were over six million non-farm dwelling units in the United States
which did not meet generally accepted standards for adequate hous-
ing. 28
Because of the high cost of land, the difficulties in assembling
tracts of land of adequate size, and in "writing down" 2 9 the cost
24. There is a conflict between the City of New York and the owners as to
the meaning of the language of Title I. See infra notes 240-54 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the current status of Title I and a proposal for a new
city resolution.
25. See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
26. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1550-52 (1949); see also
Lashly, supra note 3 (discussion of federal government's housing objectives). "A
new political philosophy was beginning to emerge to the effect that a hungry man
was not free, that a homeless family and a jobless man were slaves already, denied
the blessings of liberty which our Government was founded to secure." Id. at 881;
see also 0. BROWDER, JR., R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY
LAW 1121-22 n.3, 1326-31 (3d ed. 1979).
27,. The reasons for the housing inadequacies during 1949 included: the wartime
necessity of curtailing new home construction; the fact that the industry always
had underbuilt for the middle and lower income groups; and the constant annual
drain through condemnation, fire, storm and flood. For discussions of problems
during the 1940's in housing and slum conditions, see H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949); S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550 (1949); CONF.
REP. No. 975, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1586 (1949). See generally Lashly, supra note
3 (discussion of U.S. housing problem in 1949).
28. The housing inventory made in April, 1947 noted that over 2,000,000 new
and converted units had been added to the housing supply. See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS; CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
U.S. series P-70, No. 1 (1947). The effective nonfarm housing inventory at the
beginning of 1949 was about 34,829,000 units, of which 6,100,000 units were
considered unacceptable. Id.
29. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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of the land, cities experienced difficulties in effectuating slum clear-
ance and urban redevelopment.30 The struggle with city environments,
the problems of property values, and the human consequences of
delinquency, infant mortality and poor health highlighted the need
for a more comprehensive housing and slum clearance policy.3
The Housing Act32 was implemented by Congress in the wake of
a severe post-war housing shortage to meet the evolving problems
of slums and blighted areas.33 The Housing Act attacked the national
housing crisis by providing assistance for the establishment of pro-
grams to remedy problems in public and farm housing and to
facilitate slum clearance and housing research.34 The objective of
national housing was for the "realization ... of the goal of a
30. Wachs, Slum Clearance and Redevelopment, 39 Ky. L.J. 22 (1950) [here-
inafter cited as Wachs].
31. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1949); see also Act of
1949, supra note 2, at 685 (discussion of contemporary problems in housing and
slum conditions during 1940's). See generally Slum Clearance and Public Housing,
supra note 6 (same).
32. Pub. L. No. 171, 1 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 408 (1949); see S. REP. No.
84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550 (1949). See generally Act of 1949, supra note 2
(discussion of housing shortage present during 1940's).
33. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
[Tihe general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and
living standards of its people require housing production and related
community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,
the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through
the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon
as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family ....
42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949). See generally Hauser & Jaffe, The Extent of the Housing
Shortage, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1947) (discussion of housing problems
during 1940's).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949). The statute provides:
(4) governmental assistance to eliminate substandard and other inadequate
housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, to facilitate
community development and redevelopment, and to provide adequate
housing for urban and rural nonfarm families with incomes so low that
they are not being decently housed in new or existing housing shall be
extended to those localities which estimate their own needs and dem-
onstrate that these needs are not being, met through reliance solely upon
private enterprise, and without such aid; and
(5) governmental assistance for decent, safe and sanitary farm dwellings
and related facilities shall be extended where the farm owner demonstrates
that he lacks sufficient resources to provide such housing on his own
account and is unable to secure necessary credit for such housing from
other sources on terms and conditions which he could reasonably be
expected to fulfill.
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decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family ...."I'
The drafters of the Housing Act determined that this goal would
be attained only with the assistance of private enterprise and the
government.36 Congressional testimony indicated that the growth and
persistence of urban blight had resulted, in large measure, from the
inability of private enterprise to rebuild deteriorating parts of the
city without financial assistance.37 The problem of organizing several
parcels under diverse ownership coupled with the high cost of such
projects38 created insuperable obstacles to private development.3 9
B. The Operation of Title I in a Particular Locality
In conjunction with private enterprise, local agencies were en-
couraged to provide assistance in the development of communities.40
Title I authorized financial assistance for a local public agency to
undertake a project consisting of the assembly, clearance, site prep-
aration and sale of land for rebuilding in accordance with the area's
redevelopment plan4' and to make federal grants for as much as
See Act of 1949, supra note 2, at 691-92. See generally Lashly, supra note 3
(discussion of Housing Act's objectives).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949); see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
1550, 1559 (1949). See generally Slum Clearance and Public Housing, supra note
6 (discussion of slum clearance program).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949); see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
1550, 1559 (1949). See generally Hillman, Public Housing, Planning and Conser-
vation, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 673, 673-76 (1947) (discussion of participation of
private enterprise and local government) [hereinafter cited as Hillman]. The Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency was responsible for establishing a national housing
objective and policy to provide federal aid to assist slum clearance projects and
low-rent public housing projects. S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1550
(1949). The drafter of the farm housing portion of the Housing Act was the
Secretary of the Agriculture. Id. at 1575.
37. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1559, 1560-61 (1949). See
generally Note, The General Housing Act of 1946, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 543 (1946)
(discussion of contemporary slum problems during 1940's) [hereinafter cited as
General Act of 1946].
38. The costs of such a project includes social and economic costs, land costs,
demolition and relocation expenses. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 13 (1949).
39. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1559, 1561 (1949); see also
General Act of 1946, supra note 37, at 543 (discussion of housing problems of
private development).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949); see Hillman, supra note 36, at 674.
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two-thirds of the net loss incurred. 4 The locality absorbed the
remaining one-third of the loss. 43 Specifically, capital grants were
authorized to help meet a city's losses" in connection with the
project.45 To provide the leverage necessary for a city to embark
on these redevelopment programs, Title I attacked the obstacles of
large capital outlays and high write-down costs associated with pre-
paring slum lands for reuse.46
After an area had been prepared, it was to be sold or leased for
uses consistent with its redevelopment plan. 47 Federal aid was to be
used only to acquire and prepare the land and was not available
for the actual rebuilding of an area. 48 The variety of uses permitted
under local redevelopment plans49 generally involved significantly
lower land costs than would be entailed in the acquisition and clearing
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1453, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, 416 (1949). See
generally Note, Nondiscrimination Implications of Federal Involvement in Housing,
19 VAND. L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1966) (discussion of redevelopment in particular
locality) [hereinafter cited as Nondiscrimination Implications].
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1453, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, 416 (1949). See
generally Nondiscrimination Implications, supra note 42, at 871-72 (discussion con-
cerning redevelopment in particular locality).
44. These losses, the "write-downs," consisted of the difference between the
costs of acquiring the property by eminent domain, of clearing the site and of
relocating site tenants and the income received at a sale to the private developer.
See generally Nondiscrimination Implications, supra note 42, at 871-72 (discussion
concerning redevelopment in particular locality).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1452b, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949). "The Secretary
is authorized, through the utilization of local public and private agencies where
feasible, to make loans as herein provided to the owners and tenants of property
to finance the rehabilitation of such property." Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1453, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
47. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562 (1949). See generally
Jacobs, supra note 7 (discussion concerning redevelopment).
48. Id. The only time when federal aid could be used to acquire and prepare
land would be for loans to municipalities for facilities necessary to support the
new uses of the land. Act of 1949, supra note 2, at 701. See generally Russell,
Federal Aid to Housing: Argument For and Against Voting Federal Funds, 34
A.B.A. J. 89 (1948) (discussion of federal government's participation in local
redevelopment program).
49. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1563-64 (1949).
The pending bill limits Federal financial assistance to the assembly and
clearance of areas which either are predominantly residential or which
will be redeveloped primarily for residential use. This limitation is fully
justified in view of the fact that the primary purpose of Federal aid in
this field is to help remove the impact of the slums on human lives
rather than simply to assist in the redevelopment or rebuilding of cities.
At the same time this requirement will not interfere with the carrying
out of effective local programs which will combine the clearance of slums
[Vol. XIII
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costs of slum areas.5 0 The operation inevitably involved a loss known
as the "net project cost." 51 The net project cost coupled with the
need for funds to finance the initial costs of a project made it
uneconomical for a private developer to complete the project on his
own.52 In addition to a $1 billion loan fund," the Housing Act
authorized $500 million for capital grants to compensate in part for
this net loss.5 4
with sound local plans for the development and redevelopment of com-
munities. Most slums and blighted areas are predominantly residential
in character and, in these cases, the bill would permit their redevelopment
for whatever new uses are considered most appropriate by the locality.
It is to be noted, of course, that here the test is whether the area is
predominantly residential in "character" rather than predominantly res-
idential in "use." Where blighted commercial or industrial areas are
isolated from residential slum areas and hence must be redeveloped
separately, Federal financial assistance also would be authorized for their
assembly and clearance where they are to be redeveloped for predomi-
nantly residential uses. This does not mean that cases of isolated blighted
areas of business, industrial or commercial use, or open land, cannot
be developed for an appropriate combination of uses under the provisions
of the bill ....
Id.
50. The evidence is also clear that the reuse value of cleared slum land
will generally be substantially less than the costs of acquisition, clearance,
and preparation for redevelopment, if the land is to be rebuilt at ap-
propriate densities and in accordance with sound redevelopment plans
which will prevent the recurrence of slum conditions. Experience has
shown that state and local governments lack the financial resources to
absorb the full cost of this necessary write-down in anything like the
volume needed for the clearance of any substantial proportion of existing
slums. States and cities are increasingly aware of the social costs of the
slums, of threats to municipal solvency arising from the spread of slums
and from the increasing spread of new building to the outskirts of cities,
and of the heavy municipal outlays for city services in slum areas which
greatly exceed the tax revenues derived from those areas.
Id. at 1561.
51. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1563 (1949).
52. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 84,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1559, 1560-61 (1949) (discussion concerning the inability
of private enterprise in coping with the slum problem). Data gathered in 1947
indicated that the U.S. had to build or rehabilitate an average of at least 1,300,000
nonfarm dwelling units, and between 200,000 and 300,000 farm units a year over
the next 12 years, if substantial progress is to be made in bettering the U.S. housing
conditions. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS; CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S., series P-70, No. 1 (1947).
53. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS; CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S., series P-70, No. 1 (1947).
54. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562 (1949). See generally
Act of 1949, supra note 2; supra notes 48-50 (discussion of Title I's federal loan
program).
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To receive federal aid under Title I, a community had to meet
certain statutory requirements." The community had to have an
authorized local agency16 with the power to carry out the functions
of a slum clearance program.57 In addition, Title I required a detailed
plan, approved by the local governing body, for the development
of a project in accordance with a general community plan.58
The Title I projects in Manhattan were constructed pursuant to
the redevelopment plan of the City of New York, which was designed
to eliminate substandard housing and to provide for a suitable
residential environment as required by the Housing Act. 9 Under a
city's slum clearance program, 60 a committee selected a site and pre-
pared a comprehensive plan containing all pertinent information for
the redevelopment of the site. 61 The committee obtained the approval
for the redevelopment plan from the City Planning Commission, 62
55. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562-63 (1949).
56. See supra note 11 for discussion of the local agency's participation in a
slum clearance program.
57. The Program's goal is not only to eliminate present slums, but also to
prevent their recurrence. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550,
1564 (1949) (discussion of locality's participation in slum clearance program). See
generally Act of 1949, supra note 2. The local responsibilities include: (1) the slum
clearance projects are to be locally planned and executed; (2) the projects must
conform with comprehensive city plans for the locality as a whole; and (3) con-
sideration is to be given to local codes and regulations with respect to land use
and minimum standards of health, safety and sanitation. S. REP. No. 84, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1564 (1949).
58. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1564-65 (1949). In addition,
Title I required findings that federal assistance was needed to enable the project
area to be redeveloped and that a feasible method for the temporary relocation
of families displaced from the project area was achieved. Id. at 1564; See Wachs,
supra note 30. See generally Hillman, supra note 36, at 673-76 (discussion of
problem of relocating families displaced by clearance of slums and construction of
public improvements).
59. Each housing project had its own specific Redevelopment Plan. Each plan
described the specific housing project, surrounding area and other provisions nec-
essary to meet state and local requirements. See Act of 1949, supra note 2, at
701.
60. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 13-14 (1949). See also
Act of 1949, supra note 2, at 700-07 for a discussion involving slum clearance.
61. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 5, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also H.R. REP. No, 590, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 17 (1949). See generally Slum Clearance and Public Housing,
supra note 6 (discussion concerning redevelopment).
62. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 197-c (1976 & Supp. 1984). The City of New
York specifically delegates to the City Planning Commission the responsibility to
review "proposals and applications by any person or agency for changes, approvals,
contracts, consents, permits or authorizations thereof, respecting the use, devel-
opment or improvement of real property subject to City regulation . . . ... Id.
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the Board of Estimate, 63 and the Administrator of the United States
Housing and Home Finance Agency. 64 The private developer who
made the highest bid for the property entered into a contract with
the city, 65 which contained the restrictions and covenants necessary
to carry out the purpose of the locality's slum clearance program. 66
III. The Procedural History of Three New York City Title I
Housing Projects
In recent years, many Manhattan developers have been converting
their residential buildings from rental to ownership status. 67 Whether
conversion was a "change ' 68 in the property and thus restricted by
Title I, became a critical issue on September 15, 1983 when the
Board of Estimate adopted a resolution stating that its consent was
required for the conversion of any property developed under Title
1.69 Prior to the adoption of the Board's resolution, three Manhattan
63. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 67(4) (1976 & Supp. 1984). The Board of Estimate
is New York City's local public agency vested with final decision-making authority
concerning any changes in the use or development of city property. Id.
64. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1583 (1949). The Admin-
istrator of the Housing and Home Finance Administration is authorized to undertake
a program of loan and subsidy assistance to communities. Id.
65. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No.
15672-83 at 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also Hill, Housing-Legislative
Proposals, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 179 (1947) (discussion concerning need
of private enterprise in slum clearance programs). See generally S. REP. No. 84,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1560-61 (1949).
66. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 5, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1550, 1560-61 (1949). See generally Slum Clearance and Public Housing,
supra note 6 (discussion of guidelines implemented in slum clearance programs).
67. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B4, col. I (discussion of the three Manhattan
conversions); N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, RE7, col. I (same).
68. This Note is concerned with the varying interpretations of the "change"
provision in each project's redevelopment agreement. The essential question is
whether a conversion from rental to ownership status constitutes a change requiring
prior city approval.
69. Board of Est. Res. 76 (Sept. 15, 1983). Borough President Andrew Stein
introduced the resolution stating that the Board of Estimate should hold a hearing
concerning its powers of approval of condominium or cooperative conversions. The
Board decided that it should have the authority to approve such conversions.
Prior to the passing of its resolution, the Board of Estimate had taken the
position that no government approval or consent was required for the conversion
of a project developed by a private developer without city funds or tax exemption.
See Affirmation of Special Assistant Corp. Counsel Jeffrey E. Glen at 2, Coliseum
v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (1983). It should be noted that in response
to the position taken by the Attorney General, the City submitted the detailed
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projects commenced litigation in the New York courts. 70
A. Kips Bay Towers
Kips Bay Towers, located between First and Second Avenues and
Thirtieth and Thirty-third Streets in Manhattan, consists of two
twenty-story residential buildings. 71 The project was built 72 pursuant
to Title I of the Housing Act and section 72-k of the New York
General Municipal Law, 73 which provided the framework for slum
clearance in New York. 74
When the Board of Estimate's resolution was passed, the Kips
Bay conversion plan 5 already had been commenced. Moreover, a
non-resident purchaser of a Kips Bay unit had begun an action
against the owners of Kips Bay alleging Title I violations.76 Sub-
sequently, the New York State Attorney General barred future sales
Affirmation of Special Assistant Corp. Counsel Glen ("The Glen Affirmation"),
dated Aug. 2, 1983. The Glen Affirmation stated that the City's position and
opinion were to be that the "proposed change, from rental to cooperative ownership
is not a 'change in land use' and thus the mandatory reference in the Redevelopment
Plan is not triggered." Id. Nonetheless, the City, upon some reflection and sub-
sequent to the Sept. 15, 1983 Board of Estimate resolution, reversed its position
and joined the Attorney General. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 3-4, Coliseum
v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
70. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. The three projects are: (1) Kips
Bay Towers, (2) Coliseum Park Apartments, and (3) Park West Village. In the
Kips Bay action, the plaintiff submitted his first complaint on June 23, 1983, and
in July, 1983, both Coliseum Park and Park West commenced petitions challenging
the Attorney General's determinations.
71. Kips Bay Towers Offering Plan, at 1 (May 4, 1981); see Affidavit of Louis
A. Siegel in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-
83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
72. The Kips Bay Towers were built as part of the Slum Clearance Program
entitled New York University-Bellevue. Third Amended Redevelopment Plan, City
of New York (Sept. 22, 1964). The original agreement was entered into between
University Center, Inc. and the City of New York on September 23, 1954. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-1469 (1949). Section 72-k of the General Municipal Law
has been repealed. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 525 repealed § 72-k in 1961. The
subject matter of § 72-k is now found in Article 15 of the GENERAL MUNICIPAL
LAW. When it was used, § 72-k specifically provided that it could be utilized in
conjunction with Title I See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 72-k(3) (1949) (repealed
1961).
74. See generally Slum Clearance and Public Housing, supra note 6 for a
discussion involving slum clearance.
75. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
76. See First Amended Verified' Complaint, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-
83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). Plaintiff, a real estate attorney, was a non-
resident ("outsider") purchaser of a Kips Bay unit. The plaintiff brought suit
alleging that a specific covenant running with the property, prevented a conversion
from rental to cooperative status. Id.
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at Kips Bay until the case was resolved. 77 The New York County
Supreme Court held for the defendant owner, stating that condom-
inium sales did not constitute a "change" for purposes of the Title
I redevelopment agreements .71
The Kips Bay redevelopment agreement 79 was entered into between
University Center, Inc.80 and the City of New York."' Additionally,
77. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, at RE7, col. 1.
78. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 at 6. The issue is whether a conversion from
residential rental status to residential ownership constitutes a "change" as defined
by Title 1. If it is found to be a "change," then the conversion, by law (Title I),
should be void. See generally Kamer, Conversion of Rental Housing to Unit
Ownership-A Noncrisis, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 187 (1982) (discussion concerning
conversions from rental housing to residential ownership) [hereinafter cited as
Kamer].
79. Section 510 of the Kips Bay redevelopment agreement provides for the rights
and obligations of the Kips Bay developer.
Any deed of conveyance executed by the City in pursuance of this
Agreement shall, in addition to any other provisions and covenants,
contain covenants on the part of the grantee for itself, its successors
and assigns of the land conveyed or any part thereof, and any lessee
of the land conveyed or any part thereof, which covenants shall be
covenants running with the land, to effectuate the following:
(a) a covenant that the grantee, its successors and assigns of the land
conveyed or any part thereof and any lessee of the land conveyed or
any part thereof will and shall carry out the housing project as in this
Agreement provided, and will and shall devote such land to the uses
specified in the Redevelopment Plan contained in Schedule A of this
Agreement as said Plan may exist from time to time. Said covenant is
to run for a period of forty (40) years from the completion of the
housing project....
(b) a covenant that for a period of forty (40) years from the completion
of the housing project . . ., the land conveyed shall not be used for any
use other than the uses specified therefor in the Redevelopment Plan
contained in Schedule A attached to this Agreement or contrary to any
limitations or requirements of said Redevelopment Plan.
(c) a covenant that for the period of forty (40) years from the completion
of the housing project no change shall be made in the housing project
as set forth in the Redevelopment Plan contained in Schedule A of this
Agreement, without the consent of the City Planning Commission and
the Board of Estimate of the City or of the respective successors of said
Commission and Board ....
Kips Bay Redevelopment Agreement, § 510.
80. University Center, Inc. was the initial sponsor of the Kips Bay Property.
Third Amended Redevelopment Plan, City of New York, No. U R N.Y. 4-12
(Sept. 22, 1964).
81. The original agreement between the Kips Bay developer and the City of
New York was entered into on Sept. 23, 1954. See Hillman, supra note 36, at 674
(discussion of local public housing authority).
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a corresponding agreement relating to Kips Bay was entered into
between the City of New York and the federal government.12 This
agreement, which set forth the framework of the federal government's
participation in the Kips Bay project 3 according to the Housing
Act, provided that no federal money would be used to construct
the buildings themselves; federal funds were to be used only for
land acquisition, slum clearance and minor site improvements.14
The present owners purchased the Kips Bay Towers property in
19805 pursuant to section 505 of the amended redevelopment agree-
ment,8 6 which permitted a sale without the Board of Estimate's
consent.87 In 1981, the Attorney General of New York State accepted
82. The federal agreement was entered into by the City of New York and the
federal government on Sept. 23, 1954. See generally Robinson & Weinstein, The
Federal Government and Housing, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 581 (1952) (discussion con-
cerning federal government's participation in local housing programs) [hereinafter
cited as Robinson].
83. Section 4 of the federal agreement sets forth the framework of the federal
government's participation in Kips Bay under Title I and defines the "housing
project" as consisting of:
(1) The acquisition by the Local Public Agency [defined as the City of
New York] of all such land in the Project Area as shall be necessary
to carry out the Project Redevelopment Plan .... (2) the demolition and
removal of any buildings and improvements in the Project Area to the
extent necessary .... (3) the installation, construction and reconstruction
of streets, utilities, and other site improvements essential to the preparation
of sites in the Project Area for uses in accordance with the Project
Redevelopment Plan; and (4) the making by the Local Public Agency
of Project Land available for development or redevelopment by private
enterprise or public agencies . . . at its fair value for uses in accordance
with the Project Redevelopment Plan: Provided, That the Project shall
not include the construction of any of the buildings contemplated by
the Project Redevelopment Plan.
Id.
84. See supra notes 26-66 and accompanying text. See generally Act of 1949,
supra note 2 (discussion concerning guidelines of use of federal funds for slum
clearance).
85. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, at RE7, col. 1.
86. See Third Amended Agreement of the Initial Kips Bay Redevelopment
Agreement, City of New York (Dec. 9, 1966). The City of New York and the
Kips Bay developer were parties to the redevelopment agreement. Id.; see also
Affidavit of Louis A. Siegel in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Kramer v. Kips
Bay, No. 15696-83 at 12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
87. The original redevelopment agreement has been amended three times since
1954: first in 1960, second in 1962, and for the third time in 1966. The Dec. 9,
1966 amendment revoked the second agreement which was in effect. Affidavit of
Louis A. Siegel in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 at 12
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
An essential change of the third amended agreement involved the substitution
of Section 505 which listed the circumstances in which the sponsor could make
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the condominium conversion plan for filing.88 Since the conversion
was to be accomplished pursuant to a non-eviction plan, any tenants
of Kips Bay at the time the plan became effective could remain as
tenants indefinitely and would not have to purchase their units.
After the lower court ruling was upheld in favor of the owners,
the Kips Bay conversion plan resumed. s9
B. Coliseum Park Apartments
The second conversion plan currently involved in Title I litigation
involves the Coliseum Park Apartments, which are located at West
58th and West 60th Streets between Eighth and Ninth Avenues. The
Board of Estimate, pursuant to its 1983 resolution, 90 prevented Col-
iseum Park's conversion plan from commencing. 9' The sponsor of
changes without the Board of Estimate's consent. The new section 505 provided:
[Tihe Sponsor may, without consent or approval of the Board of Estimate:
(a) after obtaining a certificate of occupancy for each of the two apartment
buildings and two store buildings to be constructed on the Housing Site,
sell its interest in any or all of said buildings and/or in the land on
which same have been constructed....
Third Amended Agreement of the Initial Kips Bay Redevelopment Agreement, City
of New York (Dec. 9, 1966).
88. The two twenty-story towers were converted to condominiums in December,
1981 under a non-eviction plan which protected rental tenants not wishing to purchase
their apartments. Kips Bay Towers Offering Plan (May 4, 1981). Under a non-
eviction plan, existing tenants remain in occupancy and are not obliged to purchase
their apartment units. Those not purchasing retain all the rights of tenants as if
ownership had never been changed and those purchasing may elect to remain in
occupancy or sell or rent their units. Id.; See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(l)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1983-84). The statute defines a non-eviction plan as one that:
may not be declared effective until written purchase agreements have
been executed and delivered for at least fifteen percent of all dwelling
units in the building . . . by bona fide tenants in occupany or bona fide
purchasers who represent that they intend that they or one or more
members of their immediate family intend to occupy the unit when it
becomes vacant. As to tenants who were in occupancy on the date a
letter was issued by the attorney general accepting a plan for filing, the
purchase agreement shall be executed and delivered pursuant to an offering
made in good faith without fraud and discriminatory repurchase agree-
ments or other discriminatory inducements.
Id. Compare this definition with the definition of an eviction plan quoted in note
104 infra.
89. To date, no appeal has been brought before the New York courts. Kramer
v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1984, at RE7, col. 1; Real Estate Weekly, Oct. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
91. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B4, col. 1.
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the conversion sued to overturn the Board of Estimate's ruling
requiring the owner to seek city approval for the conversion of the
project from a Title I rental to cooperative apartments. 92 The New
York County Supreme Court held for the owners and permitted the
conversion to begin. 93 The decision was unanimously affirmed in the
Appellate Division, First Department. 94 Presently, the Coliseum lit-
igation is pending in the Court of Appeals for consideration of
"questions of law." 95
In the 1950's, the Columbus Circle area, which consisted of de-
teriorating and overcrowded tenement houses, parking lots and com-
mercial and miscellaneous buildings in various stages of decay, was
viewed as a slum area desperately in need of redevelopment. 96 The
Coliseum Park Apartments were constructed pursuant to a rede-
velopment plan as part of the Columbus Circle Slum Clearance
Project. 97 The redevelopment plan9 also provided for the construction
of two modern apartment buildings, a civic center, now the New
York Coliseum, to house conventions, exhibitions and other public
functions, and a public garage to ease the parking problem in the
area. 99 In December, 1952, the Columbus Circle Slum Clearance
92. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1984, at B4, col. 1. The issue in the case was whether there was a prohibited
change in "land use" or an "increase in density." See generally Garfinkel, supra
note 17 (discussion concerning condominiums); Note, Co-operative Apartment Hous-
ing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1948) (discussion involving cooperatives).
93. Coliseum, No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). The New York
County Supreme Court held that there was no change; the use was to remain
residential. Id. at 5
94. Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1984).
95. The questions of law concerned whether a conversion from rental to own-
ership status constituted a "change" as interpreted by the N.Y. City redevelopment
agreements drafted pursuant to Title I. See Brief for Appellant City of New York,
Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Ct, App. 1985).
96. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 5-6, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). The Columbus Circle Slum Clearance
project is a local program. For a discussion concerning a similar program, see
Siegel, Slum Prevention-A Public Purpose, 35 CH. B. REC. 151 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Siegel].
97. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 5, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
98. The redevelopment plan was instituted to effectuate the clearance, replanning,
reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard housing in the area. S. REP. No.
84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562-63. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 11-13 (1949). See generally Hill, Recent Slum Clearance and Urban Re-
development Laws, 9 WASH. & LEE L. REV 173 (1952) (discussion of effect of
redevelopment laws on local slum clearance programs) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
99. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 6, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
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Redevelopment Plan was approved by the Board of Estimate.1°° The
plan presented details relating to location, boundary map, land use
map, proposed zoning, proposed site plan, tenant relocation, cost
estimates and a financial plan.' 0'
On April 5, 1983, the New York State Attorney General' 02 accepted
a plan for cooperative conversion of the Coliseum buildings. 103 The
plan provided that, on the closing date, Coliseum Park would convey
its leasehold interest in the land and buildings to its tenants. 104 On
June 7, 1983, Coliseum Park was informed that the redevelopment
plan would require approval by the Board of Estimate and the City
Planning Commission. 05 In addition, the Attorney General stated
100. Id. at 8; see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1564-65 (1949)
(discussion of local responsibility to redevelopment plan). See generally Jacobs,
supra note 7 (discussion concerning redevelopment and urban renewal); Nondis-
crimination Implications, supra note 42 (same).
101. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 8, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see redevelopment plan of Coliseum
Park Apartments, City of New York (1952). See generally Jacobs, supra note 7;
Nondiscrimination Implications, supra note 42.
102. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(6)(a) (McKinney 1968) authorizes the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations to implement the statutory requirements of
disclosure in the prospectus including regulations. providing for the "method, contents
and filing procedures" of the offering. Id.
103. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No.
15672-83 at 11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984,
at RE7, col. 1; N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 27, 1984, at CLI, col. 1.
104. The Coliseum tenants comprised the proposed apartment corporation. The
Plan was presented to the tenants on April 8, 1983. The Redevelopment Plan would
become effective if, within fifteen months after such presentation to the tenants,
at least fifty-one percent of such tenants committed themselves to purchase such
shares of Coliseum Tenants as were allocated to their respective apartments. Brief
of Petitioners-Respondents at 11, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). The Coliseum plan was an eviction plan. N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 352-eeee(l)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) defines an eviction plan
as one that:
can result in the eviction of a non-purchasing tenant by reason of the
tenant failing to purchase . . . and which may not be declared effective
until at least fifty-one percent of the bona fide tenants in occupancy
... on the date the offering statement or prospectus was accepted for
filing by the attorney general (excluding, for the purpose of determining
the number of bona fide tenants in occupancy on such date, eligible
senior citizens and eligible disabled, persons) shall have executed and
delivered Written agreements to purchase under the plan pursuant to an
offering made in good faith without fraud and with no discriminatory
inducements.
Id. Compare this definition with the definition of a non-eviction plan quoted in
note 88 supra. Thus, if 51% of all bona fide tenants in occupancy desire to purchase
apartments under an eviction plan, the conversion should take place.
105. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Petitioners-
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that he intended to revoke his acceptance of the Coliseum Plan
within ten days unless Coliseum Park filed an amendment which
agreed to provide these approvals.10 6 As the plaintiff had alleged in
Kips Bay, the Attorney General based his position on a provision
of the redevelopment agreement, which provided that no change
would be made on the land for forty years without the City's
approval.107 No agreement between the Coliseum sponsor and the
City of New York relating to the Coliseum Park conversion plan
was achieved, and the present lawsuit was commenced. 08
C. Park West Village
The third housing project currently consumed in Title I litigation
is Park West Village,1°9 which is situated between Ninety-sixth and
One-hundredth Streets and between Central Park West and Am-
sterdam Avenue." 0 Park West Village, which consists of seven res-
idential buildings, was completed in the early 1960's"' pursuant to
a redevelopment plan dated June 25, 1964.112 The objective of the
plan was to rehabilitate this slum area, which was overcrowded with
deteriorated tenements." 3 The plan called for construction of a
Respondents, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 at 1-2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B4, col. 1; N.Y. Daily News, Apr.
27, 1984, at CLI, col.l.
106. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No.
15672-83 at 11-12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1984, at B4, col. 1; N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 27, 1984, at CLI, col. 1.
107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 510 of the
Kips Bay redevelopment agreement. This section is identical to § 510 of the Coliseum
redevelopment agreement, on which the Attorney General based his position.
108. Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983).
109. Like the Coliseum Park plan, the Park West conversion agreement was
prohibited from commencing without prior Board of Estimate approval. N.Y. City
Dept. of Law Resolution letter (June 10, 1983). This letter was sent to the Park
West sponsor. The letter stated that "the Offering Plans for the conversion of the
[Park West] buildings from rental status to condominim ownership could not be
accepted for filing without the prior written approval, or a waiver thereof, of the
Board of Estimate and the City Planning Commission of the City of New York."
Id. See Oct. 13, 1983 letter to Kips Bay conversion sponsor which is virtually
identical to the letter sent to the Park West and Coliseum sponsors.
110. See Redevelopment Plan of Park West Village, City of New York (1952).
111. Id.
112. The June 25, 1964 plan was an amended redevelopment plan. The original
plan was passed on February 1, 1952. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 4, Park
West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
113. Id. at 3. For a discussion concerning slums, see Johnstone, supra note 5.
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residential housing development which would be privately built."14
On May 17, 1983, Park West's owners submitted their non-eviction
plan" 5 to the Attorney General for filing. 16 On June 10, 1983, the
Attorney General informed Park West that its conversion plan could
not be accepted without the City's prior approval." 7 The Park West
sponsors brought suit to overturn the City's resolution."18 The New
York County Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's de-
termination and held for the sponsor. 19 The court stated that neither
the terms of the redevelopment agreement nor the plan required
City consent prior to conversion. 20 The decision was unanimously
affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department. 2' Presently,
the Park West litigation is in the Court of Appeals for determinations
of "questions of law.' ' 22
IV. The Interpretation of "Change" Under New York City
Redevelopment Agreements Pursuant to Title I
The language of the three conversion plans suggests that city
approval is necessary for any change made in the property during
a forty-year period.' 23 At issue is whether a conversion from rental
114. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1551 (1949); see also Siegel,
Real Property Law and Mass Housing Needs, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 30,
35-7 (1947) (discussion of general redevelopment programs).
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-eviction
plans. See generally Garfinkel, supra note 17 (discussion of condominiums).
116. See supra note 88 for a discussion concerning non-eviction plans. See N.Y.
Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at B4, col. 1; N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 27, 1984, at CLI,
col. 1; see also Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 5, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The Park West court noted: "[I]t seems clear that the 'changes' requiring
prior approval, as specified by the Agreement to which both the City of New
York, and Manhattantown, Inc. [the original developer] were parties, and which
controls the rights and responsibilities of [Park West] as a successor to Manhat-
tantown, were the changes set forth in the general statement ... of the Rede-
velopment Plan." Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83, at 14 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
121. Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1984).
122. The questions of law concerned whether a conversion from rental to own-
ership status constituted a "change" as interpreted by the N.Y. City redevelopment
agreements drafted pursuant to Title I. See Brief of Appellant City of New York,
Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Ct. App. 1985).
123. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the critical
redevelopment agreement section. The respective sections are: (1) Kips Bay Towers-
§ 51Oc; (2) Coliseum-§ 510b; and (3) Park West-§ 509b.
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to cooperative or condominium ownership constitutes a "change"
requiring prior city approval under Title 1.124 Interpreting this pro-
vision to include a change in ownership status would effectively
disallow thousands of New York City apartment unit conversions
about to be or already completed.125
The City of New York contends that the term "change" refers
to any changes in ownership status. 6 Private developers, who are
the sponsors of the conversions of these Title I projects, argue that
"change" specifically refers to differences in land use and density
and is not concerned with ownership status.'2 7 The lower court
decisions in the three Title I projects have stated that "change" has
a restricted definition concerned only with modifications in land use
and density. 21
A. Attorney General/City of New York View
The Attorney General and the City argue that Title I was intended
to subsidize a locality's acquisition of slum parcels which were
subsequently sold to private developers at moderate or below market
costs. 129 The City believed that private developers could not develop
such parcels profitably on their own. 30 Title I authorized a locality
to require a developer to demonstrate that a government subsidy 3'
was necessary to undertake profitably the clearance of a particular
housing project. 3 2 The City claimed that had these buildings orig-
124. See Kamer, supra note 78 (discussion concerning conversions from rental
housing to ownership units); see also infra notes 129-94 and accompanying text.
125. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1984, at RE7, col. 1.
126. See infra notes 129-59 and accompanying text for discussion of the Attorney
General's and the City of New York's argument. Specifically, their argument is
based on the premise that a conversion from rental to ownership status is a "change"
as defined under Title I.
127. See infra notes 160-94 and accompanying text. See generally Lehmann, Are
Condominium projects subject to local land use codes?, 55 Wis. B. BULL. 19 (No.
5 1982) [hereinafter cited as Lehmann].
128. See Kramer v. Kips Bay Towers Assoc., No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); Coliseum Park v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
129. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562-63, 64-65, 66-71
(1949). See generally Hill, supra note 98 (discussion of mechanics of local rede-
velopment programs).
130. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562-63, 64-65, 66-71
(1949). See generally Lashly, supra note 3 (discussion of government aid to local
redevelopment programs).
131. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1562-63 (1949).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1949) (discussion of Housing Act's objective of aiding
"deteriorating" areas); see S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1566-67
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inally been designated as condominiums or cooperatives,' 33 the pro-
jects would have been ineligible for government subsidies because
they would have resulted in huge profits to the developers who
would not have needed the government aid. 34 Therefore, the nature
of the ownership of each apartment was a fundamental component
of each project, and the conversion of the property interests from
rental to condominium constituted a "change" in the project.'35
Because of this change in ownership status, the City and Attorney
General alleged that the housing projects would not have been eligible
for federal funds in the first instance.13 6
In the Kips Bay litigation, for example, the plaintiff alleged that
the redevelopment plan contained numerous references to rental
housing and no mention of cooperatively-owned housing. 3 7 The
plaintiff also argued that. the entire agreement, including the rede-
velopment plan, should be considered'38 in determining the validity
of the "change" provision. 3 9 The Kips Bay plaintiff opposed the
conversion because, in his words, "Title I was people-oriented and
was not primarily concerned with land use and density."'' 40
(1949). See generally Hill, supra note 98 (discussion 'of requirements for locality
to receive federal aid).
133. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a definition of a condominium
and a cooperative.
134. See Brief of Appellant City of New York at 18, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (discussion of City's and Attorney
General's argument that Title I projects were intended to be rental buildings).
135. See Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 324 N.E.2d 536, 365 N.Y.S.2d
150 (1975). The New York State Court of Appeals characterized a conversion to
condominium status as "an extensive change of operation." Id. at 77, 324 N.E.2d
at 538, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 152. See generally Yourman, supra note 17 (discussion
involving cooperatives).
136. The City applied this argument in its brief. See Brief of Appellant City of
New York at 18, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 15-16 (1949)
(discussion of federal loan assistance).
137. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. See generally Yourman, supra
note 17 (discussion involving cooperatives).
138. This point was made by David A. Goldstein, plaintiff Kramer's attorney.
See Argument of Motions at 32, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983).
139. In contrast, the Kips Bay owners took the position that one need only look
to the redevelopment plan. They contended that the redevelopment agreements did
not involve the question of rental versus condominium 'ownershil, but only involved
the issues of land use and density. See Reply Affidavit of Louis A. Siegel in
Support.of Motion to Dismiss, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
140. Argument of Motions at 35, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct.
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The City's arguments in Coliseum and Park West are analogous
to the Kips Bay plaintiff's argument."' In both cases, the City argued
for a broad construction of the statute 142 maintaining that the Board
of Estimate contemplated that only rental housing would be built
at the three property sites. 143 According to the Attorney General and
the City, the references to "rent" support the contention that the
housing projects were to be operated only as rental developments' 44
designed to meet the needs of low and middle income people. 45
This argument has been recognized by the New York courts. 46
The City and the Attorney General suggest that the covenant
concerning "change" should be broadly interpreted to require mu-
N.Y. County 1983). David A. Goldstein, plaintiff's attorney, stated:
I say ... that the National Housing Act and the slum clearance legislation
under it for this particular project was people-oriented, not building
oriented, as an end. The number of buildings, the number of apartments
was a means to an end. The end was to provide housing in an emergency
situation with a terrific shortage after World War II for people. The
majority of the people that this project was designed to house was people
earning between $3500 and $6500 a year, not exactly the type of people
that are able to buy luxury expensive condominiums.
Id.
141. See Brief of Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Appellant City of New York,
Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
142. See infra note 148 and accompanying text for discussion of contract principle
that states that a contract should be interpreted in a way which gives each provision
meaning.
143. See Brief of Appellant City of New York at 10-12, Park West v. Abrams,
Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally Day & Fogel,
The Condominium Crisis: A Problem Unresolved, 21 URB. LAW ANN. 3 (1981)
(discussion of background history of condominiums).
144. See Brief for Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Ct. App. 1985). See generally Kamer, supra note 78 (discussion
of rental unit conversions into cooperatives and condominiums).
145. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1555-57 (1949) (discussion
concerning housing needs). See generally Lashly, supra note 3 (discussion of slum
clearance programs to benefit the poor).
146. See Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 225, 177 N.E. 427,
428 (1931) (court invalidated zoning ordinance intended to prevent "intrusion of
... apartment buildings" and to preserve rural quiet of village); see also Berenson
v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975)
(court invalidated local zoning ordinance that excluded multi-family residential
housing from affluent suburb of New York City). In proceedings to enforce the
New York State Court of Appeal's decision in Berenson, the Appellate Division,
First Department, held that zoning changes mandated by the special term were
inconsistent with the New York State Court of Appeal's decision because they
"cannot and [do] not insure that any of the multi-family units to be constructed
will be anything other than luxury condominiums." 67 A.D.2d 506, 521, 415
N.Y.S.2d 669, 678 (2d Dep't 1979).
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nicipal consent for any attempt by a sponsor to alter its predecessor's
contractual obligation to "carry out the housing project" as agreed,
including profitable conversions.1 47 Basic contract law dictates that
all provisions of a contract be interpreted in a way which gives each
provision meaning.148 The favored interpretation is the one which
will make every part of the contract effective.' 9
In these cases, the Attorney General and the City allege that the
entire agreement, including the deed and the redevelopment plan,
come under the authority of the City. 50 Therefore, the City believes
that the lower court decisions in the conversion cases, that only the
subparagraph of the redevelopment plans explicitly requiring approval
for changes in land use and density be given effect, "' conflict with
the intent of the parties to the contracts.' The redevelopment plans
do make clear that changes in land use and density are changes
which require approval.' However, the Attorney General and the
147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
148. See Fleischman v. Furgueson, 233 N.Y. 235, 119 N.E. 400 (1918). In
Fleischman, the lower court interpreted a separation agreement in a way which
rendered certain phrases meaningless. The New York State Court of Appeals reversed
and held that such a "conclusion violates a well known rule of construction ap-
plicable to instruments of doubtful meaning .... ." 223 N.Y. at 239, 119 N.E.
at 401; see also Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 42, 133 N.E.2d 688,
150 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1956) (dispute concerning interpretation of rental agreement). See
generally J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 1-3 (2d ed. 1977) (contract is
legally enforceable agreement; it is a given complex of words and acts which are
legally enforceable); CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1-6 (1st ed. 1952) (same);
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 3-6 (1st ed. 1982) (same).
149. Fleischman, 223 N.Y. at 239, 119 N.E. at 401.
150. The City and the Attorney General make this conclusion by utilizing the
principle of contract construction that all provisions of a contract should be
interpreted in a way which gives each provision meaning; see supra note 148. See
Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, Park West v.
Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
151. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 510 of the
Kips Bay redevelopment agreement, Section 510 of Coliseum's agreement and §
509 of Park Wests' agreement are identical to that of Kips Bay. See generally
Lehmann, supra note 127, (discussion analyzing land use requirements).
152. The basis of the Attorney General's and City's argument was that the
"change" provision in each redevelopment agreement was not to be restrictive. See
supra note 79 for the text of the "change" provision. See Brief of Appellant City
of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); Brief of Appellant City of New York, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). Plaintiff takes an identical
position. See Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
153. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See generally Lehmann, supra
note 127 (discussion concerning land use requirements).
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City of New York argue that to limit the application of the "change"
provision in each agreement to land use and density is contrary to
the well-settled rule that a contract should be interpreted in a way
which gives each provision meaning. 54
The City alleged that a transfer of the entire property from one
landlord to another does not constitute a "change" of the housing
plan because the status of the tenants and the housing project could
remain unaffected by such transfer. " ' For example, if the building's
managing agent remained the same and rental payments were made
directly to the managing agent, the tenants would have no idea that
a transfer between two landlords had taken place. 5 6 The City argued
that conveyances of Title I projects, as in the above hypothetical,
could occur without Board of Estimate approval and that this result
would not be contrary to the intentions of the Title I statute.'57
The City claims that the conversion of the ownership status of
property from a landlord to numerous individual condominium own-
ers is a fundamentally different transaction.'58 As such, the housing
project would be fundamentally changed if the conversion plan were
154. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussion of principles of
contract construction).
155. The City made this contention in its argument. See Brief of Appellant City
of New York at 21, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Appellant New York State Attorney General at 36-
37, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
The Kips Bay plaintiff also made this argument. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally Note, Conversion into Condominiums of
Governmentally-Assisted Multi-Family Projects, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
644 (1981) (discussion of condominium conversions).
156. The New York State Attorney General raised this argument. See Brief of
Appellant Attorney General at 36, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-
83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. The City alleges that Board of
Estimate approval is essential for a condominium or cooperative conversion to take
effect. See Brief of Appellant City of New York at 21, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Appellant City of New
York at 36-37, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983). The Board of Estimate is New York City's local public agency
vested with final decision-making authority concerning any changes in the property.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 67(b).
158. Brief of Appellant Attorney General at 36, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally Kamer, supra note
78 (discussion concerning condominium conversions). Among the distinguishing
characteristics are the following:
1) A conversion of residential rental property to [condominium] ownership
is closely regulated by statute. A transfer from one landlord to another
is not. 2) The conversion to condominium ownership often results in
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put into effect. Therefore, they claim that city approval is a pre-
requisite to the conversion. 59
B. The Owner/Sponsors' View
The conversion sponsors' argument is based on the premise that
the "change" covenant is unambiguous and clear on its face. 60 They
argue that the agreement concerns land use and not the form of
ownership.' 6' Thus, the sponsors allege that the redevelopment agree-
ment of each housing project is not affected by a conversion from
rental to ownership status.
Furthermore, the owners claim that the law does not favor re-
strictive covenants which interfere with the free use of real property. 62
It has long been held that restrictive covenants are to be construed
strictly against those who seek to enforce them. 163 The owners allege
recapitalization of the building at a much higher amount. 3) A conversion
to condominium ownership results in a change in the form of ownership
of the land. A single owner of the entire apartment building is replaced
by numerous owners of individual apartments, each of whom also owns
an undivided interest in the common areas. 4) Separate tax lot numbers
must be issued for each individual apartment in a condominium. 5) Each
apartment in a [condominium] is subject to [separate] financing arrange-
ments. 6) A Board of Managers, made up of elected unit owners, manages
the common areas of the building. 7) The building functions with rules
and regulations, and covenants in each unit owner's deed, in addition
to or instead of the landlord-tenant laws.
Brief of Appellant Attorney General at 36-37, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen.,
No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
159. See supra note 155, 157 and accompanying text. See generally Garfinkel,
supra note 17 (discussion concerning requirements of conversion plan).
160. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint at
11, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
161. Id. See generally Lehmann, supra note 127 (discussion concerning local land
use regulation on condominiums).
162. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint at
11, Kramer v.-Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see Huggins
v. Castle Estates, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 427, 330 N.E.2d 48, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1975);
Single v. Whitmore, 307 N.Y. 575, 122 N.E.2d 918 (1954); Premium Point Park
Ass'n v. Polar Bar, Inc., 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E.2d 360 (1954); Buffalo Academy
of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Etkin
v. Hyney, 32 A.D.2d 704, 299 N.Y.S.2d 862 (3d Dep't 1969). See generally BOYER,
SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 556 (3d ed. 1981) (discussion concerning restrictive
covenants) [hereinafter cited as BOYER]; BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 97-108 (3d ed.
1965) (same) [hereinafter cited as BURBY].
163. In Huggins, the New York State Court of Appeals stated:
At the outset we note that the policy of the law is to favor the free
and unobstructed use of realty and that covenants restricting the use of
property will be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce them.
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that the City of New York cannot meet this burden since the covenant
does not clearly prohibit conversion to condominium ownership. 64
Such covenants must not be given a construction beyond the literal
meaning of the terms. 165
The owners contend that the meaning of the provision is limited
to land use. 166 After examining the meaning of a "housing project," 167
the owners claim that not only is the covenant concerned with changes
of land use rather than the form of ownership but also that the
context in which it appears in the respective redevelopment agree-
ments eliminates any possible argument to the contrary. 68 The spon-
sor is required to develop the housing project only for the uses
The burden of proof is on the party endeavoring to enforce a restrictive
covenant and must be met by more than a doubtful right. Only where
it has been established by clear and convincing proof will our court
impose such a restriction.
36 N.Y.2d at 430, 330 N.E.2d at 51, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 84; see BOYER, supra note
162, at 546-50 (discussion concerning restrictive covenants); BURBY, supra note 162,
at 72 (same).
164. 36 N.Y.2d at 430, 330 N.E.2d at 51, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
165. Buffalo Academy of Sacred Hearts v. Boehm Bros., Inc, 267 N.Y. at 249,
196 N.E. at 44; see also Single v. Whitmore, 307 N.Y. at 583, 122 N.E.2d at 923.
See generally BOYER, supra note 162, at 539-43; BURBY, supra note 162, at 100-
02.
166. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 22-27, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Petitioners-Respondents
at 23-27, Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983); Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint at 13-16, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983). See generally Lehmann, supra note 127 (discussion concerning land use
restrictions on condominiums).
167. The definition of each housing project (e.g. the description of the building
and its surrounding area) is located in each property's redevelopment plan.
168. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The three redevelopment agree-
ments require the sponsor to devote the land "to the uses specified in the Re-
development Plan" and for the land to "not be used for any use other than the
uses specified ... in the Redevelopment Plan." See Kips Bay Redevelopment
Agreement § 510; Coliseum Redevelopment Agreement § 510; Park West Rede-
velopment Agreement § 509; see also Premium Point Park Ass'n v. Polar Bar,
Inc., 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E.2d 360 (1954). In Premium Point Park, the defendant
opened a refreshment stand on a lot. The stand utilized only a small portion of
the lot, and the remainder was used as parking spaces for customers. The lot was
subject to a restrictive covenant which prohibited it from being used for "a
commercial garage, or automobile parking lot." 306 N.Y. at 510, 119 N.E.2d at
361. Despite these facts, the court held that the covenant was not violated by the
use of the space for parking, relying on the context in which the words appeared
in the covenant:
While the term "parking lot" taken by itself may be ambiguous, it may
not be so regarded when considered in its present context. When read,
as it must be, in conjunction with the term "commercial garage" and
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specified. 69 These uses include the construction of fireproof multiple
dwellings, retail stores and office space.7 0
A restriction on land use' is entirely different from one affecting
the form of land ownership. 172 The New York State Court of Appeals
has held that zoning deals with land use and not with the person
who owns or occupies it. '" Although the present situation does not
involve a zoning question, the owners make the argument by analogy
that Title I is not relevant to forms of ownership. 174
Several Title I provisions strongly support the view that the cov-
enant is concerned solely with changes in land use. Section 110,
Title I's definitional section, describes a redevelopment plan as one
in the light and against the background of the covenant as a whole, its
significance is plain and unambiguous. By prohibiting a "commercial
garage," the parties clearly indicated their intent that the property should
not be used for the business of storing automobiles for a stipulated rental
.... By parity of reasoning, the parking lot prohibited is one conducted
and operated in and of itself as a commercial venture, as an independent
enterprise, apart from the business of selling comestibles.
Id. at 511, 119 N.E.2d at 361-62.
169. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text for a discussion on land
uses. See also Kips Bay § 510; Coliseum § 510; Park West § 509.
170. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of specific
land uses.
171. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. See generally Garfinkel, supra
note 17 (discussion of land use requirements); Lehmannn, supra note 127 (same).
172. See, e.g., Dexter v. Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 N.Y.2d 102, 324
N.E.2d 870, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1975); Weinrib v. Weisler, 33 A.D.2d 923, 307
N.Y.S.2d 603 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 592, 261 N.E.2d 406, 313 N.Y.S.2d
407 (1970); Bernstein v. Bd. of Appeals of Village of Matinecock, 60 Misc. 2d
470, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969). See generally BOYER, supra
note 162, at 539 (restriction of land use is one that runs with land; in contrast,
restriction concerned with forms of ownership would not bind subsequent land
owner); BURBY, supra note 162, at 97-108 (same).
173. The Dexter court went on to say:
While it is proper for a zoning board to impose appropriate conditions
and safeguards in conjunction with a change of zone or a grant of a
variance or special permit, such conditions and safeguards must be rea-
sonable and relate only to the real estate involved without regard to the
person who owns or occupies it.
36 N.Y.2d at 105, 324 N.E.2d at 871, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
174. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 590,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949); CONF. REP. No. 975, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1586
(1949). Zoning laws regulate the structure and use of a housing project. Title I
specifically excludes regulations of structure and use, as it concerns only the clearance
of an area. However, Title I is analagous to zoning in that it specifically concerns
land use. See generally Lehmann, supra note 127 (discussion concerning relationship
between slum clearance and public housing); Slum Clearance and Public Housing,
supra note 6 (same).
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which will "sufficiently . . .indicate its relationship to definite local
objectives as to appropriate land uses .... ,,75 Additional support
is derived from section 105(b), which states that when Title I land
is sold by the local public agency' 76 to a sponsor, "the purchasers
or lessees shall be obligated to devote such land to the uses specified
in the Redevelopment Plan for the project .... ,,177 Section 102
authorized loans from the federal government to local public agencies
"[to] assist local communities in eliminating their slums and blighted
areas and in providing maximum opportunity for the redevelopment
of project areas by private enterprise .... ,178 The owners claim
that section 102 contained no requirement that the redevelopment
entail any particular type of housing. 79
Further support for the sponsors' argument is found by examining
the City Planning Commission's involvement. Generally, the Board
of Estimate is the city agency vested with final decision-making
authority with respect to the use, development and improvement of
city land.'80 It must determine whether the City's interests are best
served by a change in ownership before completion of the buildings.' 8 '
On the other hand, the City Planning Commission normally will
become involved only where there are changes in land use.182
175. Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 110, 63 Stat. 413
(1949). Section 110 provides a complete definition:
(b) "Redevelopment plan" means a plan, as it exists from time to time,
for the development or redevelopment of ... a project area, which plan
shall be sufficiently complete:
(1) to indicate its relationship to definite local objectives as to appropriate
land uses and improved traffic, public transportation, public utilities,
recreational and community facilities, and other public improvements;
and
(2) to indicate proposed land uses and building requirements in the project
area ....
Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 110, 63 Stat. 413, 420 (1949).
176. In the present situation, the local public agency is the City of New York.
177. Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 105(b), 63 Stat. 413
(1949). See supra note 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of specific land
use requirements. In addition to stating the land uses for each of the Title I
projects, the initial redevelopment plans also set forth the city's "objectives" as
to traffic, transportation, utilities, recreation and other improvements, all as required
by the definition of "Redevelopment Plan" as set forth in Title I.
178. Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 102, 63 Stat. 413,
414 (1949).
179. Id.
180. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Board
of Estimate.
181. Id. See generally Kamer, supra note 78 (discussion of ramifications of
conversion from rental housing to ownership status).
182. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 192, 197(c) for a discussion of the City Planning
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In these conversion situations, the additional requirement of the
City Planning Commission's approval for any changes made in the
property lends credence to the view that the "change" provision
concerned only modifications in land use and density.'83 As a general
rule, the City Planning Commission's authority extends only to
modifications involving land use and physical alterations of the
property. 8 4 Had the City Planning Commission been empowered to
rule on any changes, the redevelopment agreements of each con-
version plan would have so provided.'85 Therefore, the owners assert
that based on the explicit terms of each agreement, changes in
ownership and land use were contemplated as distinct concepts to
be regulated differently. 8 6
Significantly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the federal body responsible for administering and inter-
preting the national housing laws,8 7 strongly urged, in Boston Five
Cents Savings Bank v. Pierce,88 that a change in ownership 89 is
not a change in use. The plaintiff in Boston Five Cents argued that
a change from rental units to cooperative ownership was a change
in use in violation of a covenant in a mortgage which proscribed
Commission's duties concerning real property. Section 197 is entitled "Uniform
land use review procedure." See also Child v. Moses, 178 Misc. 828, 36 N.Y.S.2d
574 (1942), aff'd, 265 A.D. 353, 38 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1942), aff'd without opinion,
290 N.Y. 828, 50 N.E.2d 235 (1943) for a discussion of the relationship between
the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate.
183. This requirement was upheld in the lower court decisions. See Kramer v.
Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally Lehmann, supra
note 127 (discussion examining land use requirements).
184. See supra note 182 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duties
of the City Planning Commission.
185. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a dicussion of the language
of the redevelopment agreement.
186. The redevelopment agreements explicitly state that approval is required from
both the Board of Estimate and the City Planning Commission. See Kips Bay §
510; Coliseum § 510; Park West § 509. See generally Garfinkel, supra note 17
(discussion on how federal government regulates conversion plans); Lashly, supra
note 3 (same).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949) (discussion of HUD's housing duties and functions).
188. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. Pierce, Civ. Action No. 81-34-T (D.C.
Mass 1981). See generally Comment, HUD's Authority to Mandate Effective Hous-
ing, 50 J. PUB. L. 79 (1972) (discussion concerning HUD's authority over public
housing) [hereinafter cited as HUD's Authority].
189. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. Pierce, Civ. Action No. 81-34-T (D.C.
Mass 1981). HUD's argument concerned a change in ownership from rental to
condominium ownership status. Id.
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such a change. 90 HUD echoed the sponsors' view that the use of
the property was residential before and during conversion and re-
mained residential after conversion; thus, no change in land use
occurred. 191
In sum, the owners' argument is based on the premise that the
respective redevelopment plans detail the land use and physical char-
acteristics of the project, without imposing any requirement as to
the character or form of ownership. 92 As the New York State Court
of Appeals has stated, "before a serious interference with one's
right of property is justified, something more than a doubtful right
must be shown by the one seeking to impose such limitation."'' 93
The owners argue that the absence of an explicit restriction requiring
the premises to be maintained as a rental property means that the
parties intended to impose no such restriction upon the form or
transfer of ownership. 94
V. The Legislative Purposes Behind Title I
The owners claim that where words of a statute are free from
ambiguity and their meaning is unequivocal, the legislative intent is
determined by a literal reading of the legislative history. 95 They
argue that a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the
court must take the entire act into consideration, and all sections
of the law must be read together to determine the fair meaning of
190. Id.
191. Id. HUD claimed that "[the occupants] will continue to eat, sleep and
otherwise occupy the building for residential purposes. Thus, by no stretch of the
imagination has a change in 'use' occurred, nor will such a change occur." Id.
See generally HUD's Authority, supra note 188 (discussion concerning HUD's
interpretation of residential conversion).
192. See supra notes 160-91 and infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the owners' interpretation of the "change" provision.
193. Further, the owners argue that the agreements were drafted by the City,
and since it is established law that, to the extent any ambiguity exists in a document,
it is to be construed against the maker of the document. Single v. Whitmore, 307
N.Y. at 581, 122 N.E.2d at 922. This rule is based on the principle of equity that
one cannot be permitted to take advantage of a surprise which one has created
by oneself. Id.
194. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. See generally Lehmann, supra
note 127 (discussion examining land use requirements).
195. Roth v. Michelson, 55 N.Y.2d 278, 283, 434 N.E.2d 228, 231, 449 N.Y.S.2d
159, 162, motion to amend remittitur denied, 56 N.Y.2d 807 (1982). See J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 116-17 (2d ed. 1977).
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the provision in question.196 In contrast, the City and the Attorney
General argue that construction under Title I was to be limited to
low-rent housing. 97 In addition, they allege that the conversion of
Title I projects to condominium or cooperative ownership violated
this requirement. 198
A. Attorney General/City of New York Interpretation
The Attorney General's and the City's argument is based on their
interpretation of the contractual provisions requiring the Board of
Estimate to approve any change in ownership for forty years after
completion of the project. 99 They argue that this view is consistent
with: (1) the government's interest in ensuring that private developers
are not enriched at the government's expense; and (2) the city's
interest in ensuring compliance with its comprehensive scheme of
redevelopment for the city as a whole. 200
The Attorney General and the City argue that the legislative
purpose of Title I is to stimulate low-rent housing. 20 They contend
that, although Title I does not state that the new housing project
196. Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80 (1971); see also N.Y. STATUTES § 97
(McKinney 1971). See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 116-17 (2d
ed. 1977).
197. See Joint Brief of Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83; Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 at 20 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't. 1984); see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1552
(1949). See generally Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 642 (1966) (discussion of low-income housing) [hereinafter cited as
Friedman]; Lashly, supra note 3 (same).
198. See Joint Brief of Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83; Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83, at 22 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1984); see also supra note 197 and accompanying text.
199. Reply Brief of Appellant New York State Attorney General, Park West v.
Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 at 3 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1984). See supra
note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "change" provision.
200. Joint Brief of Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83; Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83, at 21 (Ct.
App. 1985). See generally Johnstone, supra note 5 (discussion of federal government's
participation in redevelopment programs); Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of
Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deterioration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 504 (1958)
(same) [hereinafter cited as Urban Renewal].
201. See Brief of Appellant N.Y. State Attorney General at 25-34, Park West
v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1984). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 17-19 (1949); Hill, supra note 98
(discussion of local redevelopment programs); Hillman, supra note 36 (same); Act
of 1949, supra note 2 (same); Slum Clearance and Public Housing, supra note 6
(discussion examining relationship between slum clearance and low-rent housing).
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must be "replacement housing," ' 02 the inference is clear that the
legislation was intended to apply to low-rent housing.2 °3 This powerful
equity argument 2°4 was voiced by Congressman James Wright, who
spoke in opposition to a proposed housing amendment: 05
I do not think we are in the business now of trying to approve
that which the administration is attempting to do in turning low
rent projects, once they are paid out, into condominiums so that
they can be sold at higher and higher prices. And those people
who have been the beneficiaries of the reasonable rents are thrown
out to fend for themselves. That it seems to me is an outrageously
unresponsible position for us to take.2°6
The concept of a locally-designed comprehensive plan for slum
clearance and urban renewal was mandated by federal housing laws.20 7
In fact, the federal statute conditioned the approval of federal grants
on the requirement that such programs "conform in the determi-
nation of the governing body of the locality as a whole. ' 208 In New
York City, there was a general "Master Plan" in existence, 20 9 which
was designed in accordance with the objectives of the federal housing
laws. 21 0 The City contends that each redevelopment plan is only a
202. See generally Note, Relocation Assistance: An Open Door Policy to Equal
Housing Opportunity, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 639 (1972) (discussion of relocation
assistance for tenants) [hereinafter cited as Relocation Assistance].
203. See generally Friedman, supra note 197 (discussion of low-income housing);
Urban Renewal, supra note 200 (same).
204. In the Kips Bay decision, Judge Ascione stated:
This court has no quarrel with plaintiff's public policy arguments and
may even agree with them, except that Title I had a different purpose
than that which plaintiff had suggested it should have. Perhaps, in
hindsight, plaintiff's suggestions should have been the policy. Indeed,
some of our elected officials have now come to accept that view.
Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83, at 8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
205. 129 CONG. REc. H5034 (daily ed. July 12, 1983).
206. Id.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1949).
208. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1453(d)(5), 1455(a)(iii), Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413
(1949).
209. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 197a. "Plans-a. the city planning commission
shall be responsible for the conduct of a planning relating to the orderly growth
and improvement and future development of the city including adequate and
appropriate resources for the housing, business, industry, transportation, distri-
bution, recreation, comfort, convenience, health and welfare of its population."
Id. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the City's
General Master Plan. See generally Hillman, supra note 36 (discussion concerning
New York local agency participation in public housing programs).
210. Specifically, the New York City Master Plan was set up to comply with
the Federal Housing Act of 1949. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550,
1562 (1949).
CO-OP & CONDO CONVERSIONS
small part of a broader, more comprehensive scheme of neighborhood
redevelopment formulated for the entire city. 21' There is legislative
support that the locally governed master plan was intended to em-
phasize low-rent housing.2 12
B. The Owner/Sponsors' Interpretation
The owners argue that the language of the Housing Act and its
legislative history make clear that Congress intended Title I to be
applied to slum clearance only. 213 The owners argue that any con-
struction done on land cleared pursuant to Title I was a matter of
agreement between the local government' 4 and the particular de-
veloper.
215
The sponsors claim that there are no income limitations stated in
any of the Title I redevelopment agreements. 2 6 Nothing in the
language of Title I suggests any income limitations for residential
construction on Title I land. Moreover, Title I states "that money
provided pursuant to it cannot be used for housing construction,
but only for slum clearance and related matters. ' 21 7 The agreement
between New York City and the federal government did not impose
any restrictions on the character of the buildings to be constructed,
211. Joint Brief of Appellant City of New York, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83; Park West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83, at 21 (Ct.
App. 1985).
212. In Kips Bay, the minutes of the August 12, 1953 meeting of the New York
City Planning Commission (Cal #201) (CP-10127) reflect the fact that the proposed
redevelopment area, Kips Bay, is located wholly within Section M9 of the Master
Plan of sections containing areas for clearance, redevelopment and low-rent housing.
See generally Lashly, supra note 3 (discussion of local participation in redevelopment
program).
213. See infra note 214-39 and accompanying text. See generally Act of 1949,
supra note 2 (discussion concerning slum clearance); Siegel, supra note 96 (same).
214. In the present situation, the local government is the City of New York.
215. See Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint at 11-12, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
216. This argument was made by the owners in all three cases. See Kramer v.
Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
217. Section I10(c) of Title I provides that a Title I 'project' shall not include
the construction of any of the buildings contemplated by the redevelopment plan."
Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 110(c), 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
This limitation on the use of federal funds was incorporated into the Title I
agreement between the federal government and the City of New York.- See supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal agreement. The
Kips Bay, Coliseum and Park West redevelopment agreements set forth the frame-
work of the federal government's participation in the respective housing project
19851
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except that they be consistent with the project's redevelopment plan.2
Since Title I money could not be used for residential construction,
federally imposed income limitations on housing projects constructed
pursuant to Title I would be inconsistent with the statute's objectives.
The federal government has enacted other statutes to mandate
income limitations on housing.21 9 The Housing Act, of which Title
I was a part, included Title III-Low Rent Public Housing. 20 Title
III contains income limitations and restrictions similar to those that
the City alleges were in Title 1.221 The owners argued that Kips Bay,
Coliseum and Park West were developed pursuant to Title I
exclusively 222 and that Title III's restrictions are irrelevant. 223
Congress specifically stated that Title I, the slum clearance section,
should be distinct from Title III, the low-rent public housing program
section. 224 The Congressional Joint Committee recommendation of
March, 1948 concerning Title I stated:
[A] provision should be made now for federal aid to local
communities to enable them to undertake the clearance of their
slums and blighted areas so as to make such areas available for
under Title I. The agreement between the City and the federal government specifically
provided that no federal money would be used to construct the buildings themselves.
The federal government's participation is to concern only land acquisition, slum
clearance and minor site improvements. See Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub.
L. No. 81-171, § 110, 63 Stat. 413, 420 (1949).
218. See Affidavit of Louis A. Siegel in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7,
Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally
Hill, supra note 98 (discussion concerning redevelopment); Johnstone, supra note
5 (same).
219. Besides Title I, the other five titles of the Federal Housing Act are: Title
II-Amendment to the National Housing Act, Title I1l-Low-Rent Public Housing,
Title IV-Housing Research, Title V-Farm Housing, and Title VI-Miscellaneous
Provisions.
220. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1469 (1949). Title III, entitled "Low-Rent Housing,"
is a section distinct from Title I, which involves "Slum Clearance and Community
Development."
221. Id. See generally Act of 1949, supra note 2, at 692-700 (discussion of Title
III concerning low-rent housing).
222. This argument was made by the owners in all three cases. See Kramer v.
Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen, No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Park West v. Abrams, Att'y
Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. See generally Slum Clearance
and Public Housing, supra note 6 (discussion concerning differences between public
housing and slum clearance legislation).
224. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1552 (1949) for a discussion
of the intended "scope" of the Housing Act. Slum clearance and low-rent housing
were mentioned as separate and distinct "areas." Id.
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redevelopment with the active participation of private enterprise.
For this purpose, the Housing and Home Finance Administrator
should be authorized to undertake a program of loan and subsidy
assistance to communities. This program should be wholly distinct
and separate from the low-rent public housing program.
25
Therefore, the sponsors argue that the City's and Attorney General's
claim that Title I projects were intended for low or moderate income
residents and that the conversions violated that intent is without any
basis. 226
The sponsors argue that the redevelopment plans of the Title I
housing projects are consonant with Title I's purpose. 227 It was not
Title I's purpose that public money be used to provide housing for
a certain class of persons at restricted or limited rents. 28 Title I
and the Slum Clearance Program on which it is based were enacted
to encourage and promote private enterprise to relieve unsanitary
conditions, clear out slums and develop and beautify an area. 229 The
goal was to remedy the serious housing shortage, eliminate sub-
standard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of
slums and blighted areas and to provide a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family. 2
0
Legislative reports support the sponsors' view that Title I contains
neither explicit language nor implications that construction should
be limited to rental housing. Robert Moses, Chairman of the Slum
Clearance Committee of the City of New York, stated that "low
cost housing was the responsibility of the federal, state and city
governments under programs other than Title I."23 The Senate
225. Id. at 1583.
226. This argument was made by the owners in all three cases. See Reply Mem-
orandum in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at
18, Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of
Petitioners-Respondents at 41, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 55-56, Park West v.
Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
227. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1551-52, 1558-60 (1949).
See generally Urban Renewal, supra note 200, at 505 (discussion of Title l's
redevelopment objectives).
228. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550 (1949).
229. Id. at 1560-65. See generally Act of 1949, supra note 2, at 691-708 (discussion
of objectives of Title I's Slum Clearance Program).
230. S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1559 (1949); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (1949).
231. Robert Moses, the chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee of the City
of New York, made this statement in 1956. See Brief of Petitioners-Respondents
at 42, Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983).
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Committee which was involved with slum clearance said that it is
apparent that the elimination of residential slums in central city
areas and their redevelopment in accord with a plan for the most
appropriate use of the land makes necessary a dispersion of the
families now living in such slums.232 While the blighted areas may
be redeveloped in accordance with an appropriate plan, adequate
provisions must be made for the tenants displaced from the area. 233
However, the Senate Committee concluded that this did not mean
that the displaced residents must be housed on the redeveloped site.2 14
Congress recognized that government assistance was necessary to
facilitate the clearance of slums because of "the high prices com-
manded by land in the central areas of cities, even when those areas
are blighted or deteriorated. ' 235 New York courts have found that
the existence of a Title I subsidy did not impact on the form of
ownership of the project to be developed. 23 6 Moreover, Title I pro-
vides that development pursuant to the Housing Act could include
moderate to higher priced residential housing-whether privately
owned or rented. 237 The owners argue that terms such as "dwelling
units," "homes," "residential housing," and "housing" were used
interchangeably, confirming that Congress' intent was to maximize
residential housing by encouraging the rehabilitation of slum areas. 23
The language of the statute did not limit the form of ownership. 23 9
232. 95 CONG. REc. 12090 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1949); see also Federal Housing
Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 1460, 63 Stat. 413, 420 (1949).
233. 95 CONG. REC. 12090 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1949); see also Federal Housing
Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 1460, 63 Stat. 413, 420 (1949). See generally Relocation
Assistance, supra note 202 (discussion concerning relocation facilitation).
234. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
235. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1560-61 (1949). See generally
Robinson, supra note 82 (discussion concerning federal government's participation
in slum clearance program).
236. The Park West court stated that "the purpose of Title I was to enable
communities to restore needed housing, but it did not concern itself with the type
of housing, or with the nature of the occupancy." See Park West v. Abrams,
Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83, at 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 11-13 (1949). See generally
Act of 1949, supra note 2 (discussion of Title I and 1949 Housing Act); Slum
Clearance and Public Housing, supra note 6 (same).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 1452b(c) (1949); see also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1550, 1560-61 (1949). See generally Hill, supra note 98 (discussion concerning
Congress' objective of encouraging rehabilitation of slum areas).
239. See supra notes 216-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title l's
restrictions on forms of ownership.
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VI. Recommendations
At the time of its enactment, Title I's legislative history reflected
the increasing dimensions of the housing shortage for people with
low incomes. 240 The original tenants of the low-rent projects have
been the beneficiaries of the Title I legislation for over thirty years.
If the lower court rulings are upheld, these people will be displaced
from their homes. Following the Coliseum and Park West rulings,
City Council President, Carol Bellamy, who supports the tenants
groups, stated that "the decision -strikes a blow against the city's
[low and] middle income tenants." '24'
Despite the merit of the City's statement, it is irrelevant to the
cases involved here. Courts are constrained to construe and interpret
the law and the parties' agreements as written. 242 As the attorneys
for the Park West sponsors stated, "the city condemned properties
and then sold them at auction to developers, who could have built
luxury apartments had they pleased. These were not federal subsidies
earmarked for middle income housing .. ,"243 There were no rental
limitations either. In all three redevelopment plans under Title I,
there were no limitations specifying what rental fees were to be
charged .244
The key to understanding the issue is to examine the forty year
change provision in the project's redevelopment agreement, together
with the sole reference to changes in the redevelopment plan of the
area.245 By looking at these two provisions along with each rede-
velopment plan's definition of the specific housing project, 246 it is
clear that these covenants concern only land use and density and
240. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1550, 1555 (1949).
241. Real Estate Weekly, Oct. 1, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
242. See Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83, .at 8-9, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983).
243. Real Estate Weekly, Oct. 1, 1984, at 13, col. 2.
244. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 510 of the
Kips Bay redevelopment agreement. § 510 of the Coliseum redevelopment agreement
and § 509 of the Park West redevelopment agreement are virtually identical to the
Kips Bay provision.
245. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the critical
"change" provision contained in the Kips Bay, Coliseum and Park West Rede-
velopment Agreements.
246. Each redevelopment agreement required that the deed of conveyance was
to contain a covenant, running with the land, to effectuate "a covenant that for
the period of forty (40) years from the completion of the project no change shall
be made in the project as set forth in the Redevelopment Plan of the area without
the consent of the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate . .. "
and the sole reference in the area's redevelopment plan to changes is the following:
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do not represent forms of ownership.2 47 Moreover, in the three
projects concerned, it is clear that the proposed changes in the form
of ownership 24 8 are neither "increases in density" nor "changes in
land use." ' 249 The use will remain residential, and as no new con-
struction or increased occupancy is proposed, the density will not
increase. 20
In September, 1983, the Board of Estimate adopted a resolution
mandating prior city approval for all proposed Title I conversion
plans.25 1 In light of the lower court decisions of Kips Bay, Coliseum
Park, and Park West, 252 the Board of Estimate should adopt a new
resolution permitting Title I conversions to take effect without prior
approval by the Board of Estimate or City Planning Commission.
The definitional section of the Housing Act 253. states the grounds
upon which federal assistance will be given: "financial assistance
shall not be extended under this subchapter with respect to any
urban renewal area which is not predominantly residential in character
and which, under the urban renewal plan therefor, is not to be
redeveloped for predominantly residential purposes. ,,214 The proposed
resolution should include only the restriction that the project remain
residential. Any further restriction, such as maintaining the building
for rental purposes only, would be contrary to Title I's objective.
VII. Conclusion
The purpose of Title I was to enable communities to restore
needed housing, but was not concerned with the type of housing
Limitations on Change: "No increase of density or change in land use shall be
made for a period of forty years except upon approval of the Board of Estimate
of the City of New York." See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the "change" provision contained in the Kips Bay, Coliseum and
Park West redevelopment agreements. Each housing project was defined in its
redevelopment plan. Each plan described the specific housing project, surrounding
area and other provisions necessary to meet state and local requirements.
247. See Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup, Ct. N.Y. County 1983);
Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Park
West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
248. The proposed changes concern changes from rental to cooperative or con-
dominium ownership.
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. See Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83, at 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
251. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
252. See Kramer v. Kips Bay, No. 15696-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983);
Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); Park
West v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 16526-83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
253. See 42 U.S.C. ch. 338, § 1460, 63 Stat. 413, 420 (1949).
254. Id.
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established or with the nature of the occupancy of the premises. 255
Neither was Title I concerned with the question of whether the units
were to be occupied by renters or by their owners. 2 6 Since the
covenants contained in the redevelopment agreements regulate only
land use and density, not forms of ownership, the Board of Estimate
and the City Planning Commission should not have the authority
to approve Title I property conversions. If such approval were
required, the outcome would be to throw the entire question of real
estate into the political machinations of the local city agencies.
Steven C: Forest
255. See Coliseum v. Abrams, Att'y Gen., No. 15672-83, at 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
256. Id.

